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1 Introduction
The impact of uncertainty shocks on macroeconomic performance has been intensively
debated in the recent literature (see, e.g., Bloom, 2009; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011;
and Bloom et al., 2014). Specically, the interaction between monetary policy and un-
certainty has received considerable attention (Taylor, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2013). One
type of uncertainty that has been long recognized to have negative welfare eects is in-
ation uncertainty (IU) (see, e.g., Fischer and Modigliani, 1978; Barnea et al., 1979). In
particular, Friedman (1977) and, more recently, Taylor (2012) discuss how certain types
of monetary policy can give rise to IU or macroeconomic uncertainty in general. In a
theoretical model, Ball (1992) formalizes the idea of Friedman (1977) and emphasizes
that it is particularly the interaction of monetary policy and ination which generates IU.
Moreover, Ball and Cecchetti (1990) stress that the relation between changes in monetary
policy and IU should be most clearly detectable when considering long-term rather than
short-term IU.
In this study, we consider a range of policy measures that assess the stance of monetary
policy. The relation of these metrics to IU is evaluated in terms of a general multi-
country model for 13 developed economies which allows for the interaction of monetary
policy and macroeconomic conditions. Although the importance of this interaction for the
emergence of IU is theoretically well-established, it has so far been largely disregarded in
the related empirical literature. Following the arguments of Friedman (1961) and Ball and
Cecchetti (1990), our empirical analysis concentrates on the low-frequency component of
IU. This quantity is measured in the framework of the Spline-GARCH model proposed
by Engle and Rangel (2008). In contrast to conventional GARCH models, which are
routinely employed to measure IU, this approach enables the specication of a exible,
time-varying low-frequency component of the variance process. Specifying IU in terms
of the conditional variance of the unpredictable component of ination is in the spirit of
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the measure of time-varying macroeconomic uncertainty recently suggested in Jurado et
al. (2013). We do not consider survey-based measures of IU, which are an alternative
approach commonly adopted in the related literature (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987;
Giordani and Soderlind, 2003). This is because such data is available only for short time
periods and for a limited set of economies such as the Euro area or the US and therefore
precludes the consideration of a larger cross section. This, however, is crucial to identify
the impact of changes in the conduct of monetary policy on IU because such changes are
usually observed too infrequently within a single economy.
Alternative methods to distinguish between dierent monetary policy schemes are
based on the quantication of deviations from the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) and the
appointment dates of central bank governors.1 In the rst case, we obtain a measure
of rule-based as opposed to discretionary monetary policy in the sense of Taylor (1993,
2012). Second, we distinguish central bank governors by their degree of ination-aversion.
According to Nordhaus (1975), Samuelson (1977), Alesina and Sachs (1988) or Berger and
Woitek (2005), liberal governors are typically perceived as more ination-tolerant. Hence,
we follow Sturm and De Haan (2001) and Dreher et al. (2008, 2010) and relate changes
in a monetary authority's degree of ination-tolerance or -aversion to the appointment
dates of central bank governors. We regard governors who are appointed under liberal
governments as ination-tolerant as opposed to the presumably ination-averse governors
appointed under other types of governments.
We analyze the relation between IU and its potential determinants in an empirical
model that allows for cross-country dependencies and unobserved characteristics of the
IU process which vary across economies and time periods. The estimation of a cross-
sectional average trend in IU shows that long-term IU has been decreasing during the
Great Moderation period until the year 2003, but subsequently rising since the unfolding
1In the following, a monetary authority's chairperson is referred to as \central bank governor", irre-
spective of whether the actual title is \governor", \chairman" or \president", etc.
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of the recent nancial- and sovereign debt crisis until the end of the sample period in the
year 2010.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that long-term
IU, as measured by the Spline-GARCH model, is signicantly higher during times when
monetary policy is more ination-tolerant than otherwise. In particular, IU increases if
ination-tolerant governors are in power during high-ination periods. This conrms the
theoretical argument of Ball (1992) that high ination leads to high IU if there is uncer-
tainty about the central bank's willingness to disinate. This joint eect of ination and
the preferences of monetary policy is markedly stronger than the inuence of ination in
isolation, which is a commonly adopted means of explaining IU in the empirical literature.
Second, we nd that IU increases with the degree to which the target interest rate set
by monetary policy deviates from the Taylor rule. Notably, IU is higher during periods
when the target rate is lower than the prescribed rate, i.e. if monetary policy is overly
expansive. This nding is in line with the argument put forth in Taylor (2012) that
unpredictable, i.e. ad-hoc rather than rule-based, monetary policy creates uncertainty
and, thereby, leads to poor economic performance. Interestingly, the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) reports that for several countries { which are included in our study {
market expectations of future policy rates are currently below the trajectory prescribed
by the Taylor rule and argues that the \the risk of normalizing too late and too gradually
should not be underestimated" (BIS, 2014, p.101). Our ndings suggest increasing IU as
one of the channels through which such risks could materialize.
By considering alternative methods to approximate IU, we show that the Spline-
GARCH-implied measure is most appropriate to examine how macroeconomic determi-
nants and monetary policy are associated with IU. As expected, pure measures of ex-post
ination variability, which are often associated with IU, are less suitable since such met-
rics can only be regarded as noisy approximations of ex-ante uncertainty. Importantly, by
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quantifying IU with an ex-post measure such as the intra-yearly variability of ination, we
obtain results which indicate a weak or seemingly missing relation between IU, changes
in the conduct of monetary policy and the interaction of monetary policy with the level
of ination. We also document that our measure of long-term IU and the interquartile
range of ination expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters of the US FED
are strongly related.
Additionally, we provide several robustness checks and show that our main results
remain unaected. Among other things, we document that IU increases with the volatility
in global equity markets which compliments the ndings in Engle and Rangel (2008) and
Conrad and Loch (2014). In addition, our results show that IU is lower in countries where
the central bank is legally declared as being independent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After a review of the extant
empirical literature in Section 2, we introduce our approach to measure IU and describe the
empirical setup to examine its potential determinants in Section 3. Section 4 introduces
the data set. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 summarizes the main ndings and concludes.
2 Related studies on the determinants of IU
One of the most frequently investigated determinants of IU is the level of ination. Widely
cited discussions of the relationship between ination and IU include Okun (1971), Fried-
man (1977), Fischer and Modigliani (1978) or Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Ball (1992)
formalizes the hypothesis of a causal impact of ination on IU. In the majority of these
theoretical studies, the relation between ination and IU arises due to the intervention of
monetary authorities who respond to changes in either ination or IU.
Most of the empirical studies test for Granger-causality between the level of ination
and IU. This empirical approach is appealing because of its well-established statistical
5
properties and straightforward interpretation of the corresponding test statistics. How-
ever, many of these studies do not explicitly allow for the possibility that distinct mon-
etary policy schemes have dierent eects. Moreover, the interaction of macroeconomic
conditions and the monetary policy framework is typically disregarded.
Several studies examine the inuence of dierent monetary policy schemes on IU. In
a study on the relation between ination and IU in the US, Evans and Wachtel (1993)
document that changes in the monetary policy regime are an important determinant of
IU and argue that such regime changes occur only infrequently. They argue that changes
in the monetary policy regime can lead to structural breaks in the ination process and
estimate the timing of regime changes by means of a Markov-switching model. Batchelor
and Orr (1991) investigate the eect of ination targets, the political orientation of the
government and other inuences on IU in the UK. They proxy IU by the root mean squared
error (RMSE) computed from a cross section of survey-based ination expectations and
nd that IU tends to be higher under more ination-tolerant regimes.
Similarly, Kontonikas (2004) investigates the relation between IU and ination target-
ing in the UK and nds that IU as measured by a GARCH model is lower after the Bank
of England adopts a formal ination target. Caporale and Kontonikas (2009) show that
the relation betwen IU and ination in European economies is aected by the formation
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the year 1999. Similarly, Hartmann and
Herwartz (2013) document that IU is signicantly smaller in EMU economies after the
introduction of the Euro as compared to both the situation beforehand and outside the
currency union.
Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2010) or Dovern et al. (2012) study the inuence of the
monetary policy framework on the cross-sectional dispersion (\disagreement") of survey-
based ination expectations. Disagreement in ination expectations is often regarded as
a measure of IU (Bomberger and Frazer, 1981; Holland, 1993). While Capistran and
6
Ramos-Francia (2010) report that the disagreement of ination expectations is lower in
economies where ination targeting strategies are adopted, Dovern et al. (2012) document
that the dispersion diminishes with increasing degrees of central bank independence.
Though the inuence of macroeconomic conditions and the characteristics of monetary
policy on IU has been documented in several studies, these determinants are typically
considered one at a time, thereby eectively disregarding potentially important interaction
eects. Such an interaction eect is described by the theoretical model of Ball (1992),
where the combination of higher levels of ination and uncertainty about the degree of
ination tolerance of monetary policy drives IU.
3 Measuring and analyzing long-term IU
IU is an unobservable quantity. The choice as to which of the alternative proxies that
have been proposed to measure it is most suitable depends on the question under con-
sideration. One of the most widely used methods to measure IU is to model the level
of ination in terms of an autoregressive (AR) specication or a reduced-form Phillips
curve (Canova, 2007; Stock and Watson, 2008) and to employ the conditional volatility
of the corresponding disturbance process, specied in terms of a (G)ARCH model, as an
expression of IU (Engle, 1982, 1983; Bollerslev, 1986).2 Since in a stationary GARCH
model the unconditional variance, i.e. long-term IU, is constant by assumption, we can
think of the corresponding conditional variance as a proxy for short-term IU. While this
measure may properly reect the inuences of temporary movements in ination on IU,
modeling the response of IU to (permanent) changes in economic policy or macroeconomic
conditions (as discussed in Ball and Cecchetti, 1990, or Ball, 1992) requires a specication
which allows for secular variations in IU. Specically, Ball and Cecchetti (1990) model
ination as a random walk plus noise and show that the eect of higher levels of ination
2In the following, we use the terms volatility and variance interchangeably.
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on IU becomes more pronounced at longer horizons.3 Similarly, Fischer (1981) argues that
the way in which monetary policy is implemented can be expected primarily to aect the
low-frequency movements in IU. Following these arguments, we employ a measure of long-
term or low-frequency IU in this study. The measure will be based on the Spline-GARCH
model of Engle and Rangel (2008) which allows us to separate the conditional variance of
ination into a short-term and a long-term component, with the latter changing smoothly
over time.
We adopt a two-stage procedure similar to the one employed by Engle and Rangel
(2008). First, we estimate the coecients of the Spline-GARCH model based on monthly
observations and then aggregate the conditional variances to a yearly frequency. Second,
the implied low-frequency (yearly) IU measure is related to indicators of institutional
conditions and economic quantities for which only annual observations are available.
3.1 Estimating IU by means of the Spline-GARCH model
We specify the conditional mean of the ination process as a reduced-form Phillips curve.
The ination rate in economy i, i = 1; :::; N , observed in year t, t = 1; :::; T , and month
m, m = 1; :::;M , is denoted by i;t;m. Similarly, the growth rate of industrial production
is denoted as yi;t;m. The country specic reduced-form Phillips curve reads as
i;t;m = i +
P
()
iX
p=1
i;pi;t;m p +
P
(y)
iX
p=1
'i;pyi;t;m p + ui;t;m; (1)
where i represents a constant, i;p and 'i;p are the parameters on lagged ination and
output. The orders of the lag polynomials in i;t;m and yi;t;m are denoted P
()
i and P
(y)
i ,
respectively, and are selected by the BIC. The maximum lag order is set to twelve.4
3The model used in Ball and Cecchetti (1990) is observationally equivalent to an IMA(1,1). Stock
and Watson (2007) show that this specication adequately describes the US ination process.
4Alternative choices for the maximum lag order or the selection of P
()
i and P
(y)
i by means of the
AIC lead to qualitatively equivalent results.
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Furthermore, to keep the notation tractable, we do not account for cases when lag poly-
nomials are covering the instances m  p;m  p+1; :::;m, which pertain to distinct years
such as t  1 and t, for instance.5
Modeling the Phillips curve relation based on industrial production instead of unem-
ployment is a commonly adopted way to specify the conditional mean of the ination
process in the empirical literature on IU (Fountas and Karanasos, 2004; Grier et al.,
2004). Proceeding in this way seems warranted given the empirically documented stable
relation between output growth and unemployment (Blinder, 1997).6
We assume that the innovations to ination are given by
ui;t;m =
p
hi;t;mZi;t;m; Zi;t;m
iid (0; 1); (2)
with hi;t;m = i;tgi;t;m; (3)
where i;t and gi;t;m denote the low- and high-frequency components of the conditional
variance. While gi;t;m changes at a monthly frequency and is intended to capture the
transitory component of ination volatility, i;t changes at a yearly frequency only and
reects long-term inuences such as changes in the institutional conditions of monetary
policy. The long-term trend in IU is modeled as an exponential spline function given by
i;t = i exp
 
!i;0t+
KiX
k=1
!i;k(max(t  tk 1; 0))2
!
: (4)
In (4), the exibility of the trend function increases with the order Ki. Short-term IU is
expressed in terms of a unit variance GARCH process, which reads as
gi;t;m = (1  i   i) + i
 
u2i;t;m 1=i;t

+ igi;t;m 1 (5)
5For example, our notation should be understood as i;t;0 = i;t 1;M .
6Moreover, for some of the economies we examine, monthly unemployment series are not available in
the early years of the sample period.
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with i > 0; i > 0 and i + i < 1. The specication in (5) ensures that E[gi;t;m] =
1. Hence, the time-varying unconditional variance of the innovations to the ination
process is given by E[u2i;t;m] = E[gi;t;mi;tZ
2
i;t;m] = i;t, i.e. by the slowly evolving long-
term component. Note that the Spline-GARCH model reduces to the standard GARCH
model when i;t = i is constant. The parameters (i; i; i; !i;0; :::; !i;Ki)
0 are estimated
by means of quasi-maximum likelihood, whereby the BIC guides the selection of Ki.
We base our measure of IU on the monthly series of conditional variancesEi;t;m 1[u2i;t;m] =
hi;t;m, where the expectation is conditional on the information available up to monthm 1.
The hi;t;m can thus be considered as an ex-ante measure of the monthly IU. When exam-
ining the linkages between IU and macroeconomic and institutional settings, we focus on
the dynamics of IU at an annual frequency. For this, we dene our measure of annual IU
in country i and year t as the square root of the aggregated monthly conditional variances:
IUi;t =
 X
m2t
hi;t;m
!1=2
= 
1=2
i;t
 X
m2t
gi;t;m
!1=2
: (6)
Since gi;t;m is one on average, IUi;t will vary around the slowly moving long-term uncon-
ditional volatility of ination. However, during turbulent times with persistent variations
in the short-term component, IUi;t might considerably deviate from 
1=2
i;t .
Furthermore, we construct an ex-post measure of the intra-annual variability of ina-
tion as
SDi;t() =
 X
m2t
(i;t;m   i;t)2
!1=2
; (7)
with i;t = (1=12)
P
m2t i;t;m. Besides being an ex-post measure of ination variability,
we can think of SDi;t() as a noisy proxy of IUi;t (see Engle et al., 2013, and Conrad and
Loch, 2014). In analogy to (7), we calculate the annual variability of output, denoted by
SDi;t(y).
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3.2 Determinants of IU
Apart from uncertainty regarding future monetary policy and macroeconomic factors,
IUi;t can be driven by various other factors that are mostly outside the range of decision
making at the national level. The importance of such factors is reected in the debate over
the sources of the Great Moderation. It is highly controversial whether the attenuation of
rst- and second-order ination dynamics in many economies during the 1980s and 1990s
should be primarily regarded as a success of monetary policy or as the result of a reduced
magnitude of inationary (e.g. oil price-) shocks at a global scale. On the one hand,
Taylor (2012) argues that a rule-based type of monetary policy should be ascribed primary
responsibility for the Great Moderation. Empirical support for this argument is provided
by Gal and Gambetti (2009), Herrera and Pesavento (2009) or Conrad and Eife (2012).
On the other hand, Benati (2008) argues that changes in the type of ination surprises
may be the primary source of the Great Moderation in the UK. Similarly, Ciccarelli and
Mojon (2010) nd that a main component of ination rate uctuations in the G7 is a
common international trend which they refer to as \global ination".
The presence of global inuences on IUi;t might give rise to biases in single-economy
time-series estimates regarding the impact of the monetary policy framework on IUi;t.
Thus, to account for such threats to the validity of the empirical design, we complement
the information drawn from the country specic time series by cross sectional data from
13 advanced economies. Following Engle and Rangel (2008), we estimate the relation
between IUi;t and its covariates in the framework of the seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) model. This framework allows us to control for both unobserved heterogeneity and
dependencies across economies. The model specication for economy i in year t is given
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by:
IUi;t = x
0
i;t 1 +D
0
i;t 1 + ei;t; (8)
where ei;t = t + i + vi;t; (9)
vi;t = ivi;t 1 + i;t (10)
and (1;t; :::; N;t)
0 iid (0;). In (8), the predetermined macroeconomic quantities are sum-
marized in xi;t 1 = (i;t 1; yi;t 1; SDi;t 1(); SDi;t 1(y))0. It is theoretically well estab-
lished and empirically documented that IUi;t increases during periods of higher ination
(Okun, 1971; Friedman, 1977; Conrad and Karanasos, 2005). Mankiw et al. (2003) dis-
cuss the relation between yi;t 1 and the disagreement of survey expectations of ination.
Further empirical investigations of this relation are provided by Brunner (1993) or Aper-
gis (2004). In line with these studies, we include past ination i;t 1 and output growth
yi;t 1 as potential drivers of IUi;t. Moreover, the relation between IUi;t and the variability
of i;t 1 and yi;t 1 is examined by including SDi;t 1() and SDi;t 1(y).
Next, we introduce several metrics which quantify the inuence of monetary policy
conditions on IUi;t. These determinants are summarized in the vector Di;t 1. Two mea-
sures in Di;t 1 are based on the interest rate, Ri;t 1, which is set by a country's central
bank. The rst measure is derived from the Taylor rule, a widely used means to quantify
the predictability of monetary policy. Following (Taylor, 1993), we specify economy i's
target interest rate R?i;t 1 as a function of the real interest rate ri, the deviation of i;t 1
from its target level ?i and the output gap ~yi;t 1 such that
R?i;t 1 = ri + (i;t 1   ?i ) + y~yi;t 1: (11)
In (11),  and y denote the weights attached to deviations of ination and output from
their target- and long-run value, respectively. Though not all economies in the cross sec-
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tion have explicitly announced ination targets, during recent decades ination targeting
has become a widespread monetary policy rule among industrialized economies. Leaving
aside a particular recommendation about the most suitable values for and y, we mea-
sure the extent to which monetary policy corresponds with the original specication of
Taylor (1993), in which  = 1:5, y = 0:5 and a level of 2% for both ri and 
?
i is assumed.
The same specication is also employed, for example, by the BIS to compare market-
implied interest rates to the ones prescribed by the Taylor rule (BIS, 2014). Similarly, we
use the absolute value of past deviations of the actual interest rate from the target rate
suggested by the Taylor rule, denoted as j ~Ri;t 1j, where ~Ri;t 1 = Ri;t 1 R?i;t, as a potential
determinant of IU. However, the response of IUi;t to contractionary (positive) and expan-
sionary (negative) deviations is not necessarily symmetric. Thus, in an alternative speci-
cation, Di;t 1 contains ~R+i;t 1 = ~Ri;t 11( ~Ri;t 1 > 0) and ~R i;t 1 = ~Ri;t 11( ~Ri;t 1 < 0),
where 1() denotes the indicator function.7 Moreover, the variability of short-term inter-
est rates might reect a lack of smoothness in the way how monetary policy is conducted.
Based on quarterly interest rates Ri;t 1;q, we compute a measure for the steadiness of the
interest rates set by a central bank in year t  1 as
V ri;t 1(R) =
s X
q2t 1
(Ri;t 1;q  Ri;t 1;q 1)2: (12)
Rudebusch (2002) or Soderlind et al. (2005) discuss the relation between the variability of
interest rates and distinct forms of inertia in central banks' behavior. We consider metrics
such as ~Ri;t 1 and V ri;t 1(R) as quantitative measures of the monetary policy stance.8
Moreover, monetary policy regimes may be classied as rather ination-tolerant or
7Alternatively, a binary distinction between rule-based and ad-hoc ways to conduct monetary policy
is obtained by means of identifying periods where the most pronounced deviations from a particular
prescription for monetary policy occur. For example, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al. (2013) adopt such a
strategy by detecting structural breaks in Taylor rule deviations.
8Note that a high value of V ri;t   1(R) does not necessarily imply that monetary policy is not pre-
dictable. High values ofV ri;t   1(R) can also occur if monetary policy is rule-based, but adjusts to rapidly
changing macroeconomic conditions.
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ination-averse. We separate these two monetary policy schemes by means of the dummy
variable dtoleranti;t 1 , which is one if a central bank governor was appointed under a left-
wing government and zero in all other cases.9 The concept to connect the convictions
of central bank governors to the political conditions at the time of their appointment is
discussed, e.g., in Chapell et al. (1993) and is employed in empirical studies of distinct
governments' inuence on monetary policy by Grier (1991) or Belke and Potrafke (2012).
Our specication can be thought of as an implementation of the theoretical model in
Ball (1992), where liberal central bank governors give rise to IUi;t because, in contrast
to other governors, they cannot be expected to disinate during high-ination periods.
In this model, IUi;t is triggered by the appointment of ination-tolerant central bank
governors only if ination exceeds a certain level. Thus, in addition to dtoleranti;t 1 , Di;t 1
includes the indicator variable d>Tii;t 1, where d
>Ti
i;t 1 = 1 if i;t 1 is larger than a country-
specic threshold Ti. The selection procedure for the threshold Ti is data-driven and
will be introduced in the next Section along the description of the data set. The joint
eect of high ination and uncertainty about future monetary policy is then modeled via
the interaction term dtolerant;>Tii;t 1 = d
tolerant
i;t 1  d>Tii;t 1. Moreover, since our sample period
covers several decades, the country-specic threshold may also vary over time. Since the
estimation of time- and economy-specic thresholds is likely to be inecient, we employ a
measure which quanties temporary deviations of ination from its long-term trajectory.
This metric is given by ~GAPi;t 1 = i;t 1   t 6i;t 2, where t 6i;t 2 = (1=5)
P5
j=1 i;t j 1 and
is referred to as the ination gap in the following. Measures which are similar to ~GAPi;t 1
are employed by Cogley (2002) or Stock and Watson (2010) for deviations of ination
and unemployment, respectively, from their long-term trajectories. The corresponding
interaction term with the type of central bank governor is given by dtoleranti;t 1  ~GAPi;t 1 .
Finally, the error process of the SUR model is given by (9) and (10). The covariance
9The sensitivity of the empirical analysis regarding the classication of dtoleranti;t 1 for Eurozone
economies is examined in Section 5.5.
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matrix  is specied such that it allows for heteroscedasticity and nonzero correlations
among the disturbances (1;t; :::; N;t)
0. This structure of the error term is taken into
account by means of SUR estimation of the model described in (8) to (10). In the
representation (9), unobservable inuences on IUi;t are decomposed into a global time-
xed eect denoted by t on the one hand and country specic characteristics on the other
hand. We mainly think of the time-xed eect t as representing the Great Moderation.
As in Engle and Rangel (2008), we separate cross section-specic characteristics into
time-invariant country-xed eects i and short- to medium-term dynamics. The latter
are modeled via the AR specication of vi;t in (10). Time-invariant country specic eects
may arise from distinct historical experiences such as episodes of excess ination, e.g. the
German hyperination period during the years 1920-1923 (Alesina and Summers, 1993). A
source of idiosyncratic dynamics in IUi;t might be (unexpected) exchange rate adjustments
or incidences of scal dominance (Davig et al., 2011). In the latter case, monetary policy
decisions might be restricted during times of increasing government decits.
4 Data
Our data set covers a cross section of N = 13 advanced economies: Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK
and the US. All series (except interest rates) are obtained from Datastream and seasonally
adjusted by means of the X12 method. The data on interest rates set by central banks, Ri;t,
are provided by the International Monetary Fund.10 Annualized monthly CPI ination is
calculated as i;t;m = 1200 ln(CPIi;t;m=CPIi;t;m 1) and the growth rate of the industrial
production (IP) index as yi;t;m = 1200  ln(IPi;t;m=IP i;t;m 1).11 The sample covers the
period between 1975:1 and 2010:12. With m = 1; :::; 12 and T = 36, the dataset consists
10We thank Matthias Neuenkirch for sharing the dataset in a readily useable format with us.
11For the UK, we determine i;t;m by employing the so-called \Retail Price Index" which is the most
widely used price index in this country.
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of 13 432 monthly observations. While the annualized monthly rates i;t;m and yi;t;m
are used to estimate the parameters of the Spline-GARCH model described in (1) to (2),
the annual rates i;t = (1=12)
P12
m=1 i;t;m and yi;t = (1=12)
P12
m=1 yi;t;m are employed as
explanatory variables in the analysis of low-frequency IUi;t.
For each country, Table 1 reports the average yearly ination rate, i = (1=T )
P
t i;t,
the average of the intra-yearly standard deviations, SDi() = (1=T )
P
t SDi;t(), and
the corresponding statistics yi and SDi(y) for industrial production. As can be seen from
Table 1, both i and SDi() vary considerably across countries. To take this heterogeneity
into account, we dene the country-specic threshold indicator variable d>Tii;t = 1fi;t >
i + SDi()g, which equals unity in case of \high" ination rates.
[Place Table 1 here]
The indicator dtoleranti;t distinguishes between ination-averse and -tolerant central bank
governors. If a governor is appointed during the term of a liberal government, we code
dtoleranti;t = 1, whereas d
tolerant
i;t = 0 in all other cases. The classication of governments is
taken from data constructed in Beck et al. (2001), who distinguish between right-wing,
left-wing and centrist governments by assessing the respective governing party's stance
towards economic policy. Appointment dates, in turn, are provided by Sturm and De
Haan (2001). This data set is also discussed in Dreher et al. (2008, 2010).
Finally, the output gap is given by ~yi;t;m = ipi;t;m   ipHPi;t;m, where ipHPi;t;m is the long-
term trend of ipi;t;m = ln(IPi;t;m) as estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott lter with the
smoothing parameter set to 129600, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for monthly
data. Annual series ~yi;t are obtained as ~yi;t = (1=12)
P
m2t ~yi;t;m.
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5 Empirical results
In this Section, we rst summarize economy-specic diagnostics for the Spline-GARCH
model outlined in equations (1) to (5). Second, we graphically examine the country-
specic trajectories of the IUi;t-series as implied by the estimates of the Spline-GARCH
model and provide correlation statistics between our measure of IUi;t and its potential
determinants. Third, the estimation results for the model in (8) and (9) are reported and
discussed. Finally, we assess the robustness of the empirical ndings with respect to model
specication, alternative choices of the dependent variable and the sample period. We also
compare the employed measure of IUi;t to a survey-based proxy of ination uncertainty.
5.1 IU at the yearly frequency
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results for the Spline-GARCH model. In the second
and third column, the lag orders P
()
i and P
(y)
i for the Phillips curve in (1) are reported.
The lag orders selected for ination are between 4 and 10, whereas according to the BIC
industrial production is only relevant in four (with lag orders between 1 and 4) out of the
thirteen economies. The parameter estimates for the unit variance GARCH specication
in (5) are given in columns 4 and 5 and imply that the short-term component is covariance
stationary for all countries. Moreover, the parameter Ki in the spline function in (4) is
shown in the rightmost column of Table 2. For all economies except Norway, the BIC
suggests Ki = 1. This means that the estimation of i;t in (4) is conned to the most
slowly evolving uctuations.
[Place Table 2 here]
The graphs in Figure 1 display the country-specic evolution of IUi;t. Although the
plots show substantial dierences in the evolution of IUi;t across the 13 economies, the
countries can be broadly separated into two categories. France, Germany and Switzerland
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are characterized by comparably low and stable levels of IUi;t during the whole sample
period. For the remaining countries, the trajectories of IUi;t show a marked decline during
the rst half of the sample period. This remarkable similarity is usually referred to as
the Great Moderation (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Benati, 2008) and is potentially the
result of a rule-based and predictable monetary policy (Taylor, 2012). The dynamics of
IUi;t varies across these economies mainly in terms of the magnitude of the reduction.
However, for several economies IUi;t shows a tendency to increase from the year 2000
onwards. This rise of IUi;t is clearly visible for Canada, Norway, the UK and the US.
Less pronounced increases can be observed for the EMU member economies Portugal and
Spain. The contrast between the more tranquil period during the Great Moderation and
the subsequent uprise of uncertainty is discussed in Taylor (2012) for the case of the US.
Taylor (2012) associates the increase in uncertainty beginning in the 2000's with failures
of monetary policy to adhere to transparent and predictable rules. Though it refers to a
more general macroeconomic context, the emphasis on the impact of policy uncertainty
described by Taylor (2012) resembles the discussion of Ball (1992), where uncertainty
about the conduct of future monetary policy is the main source of IUi;t.
[Place Figure 1 here]
Table 3 presents the averages of the correlations between IUi;t and its potential deter-
minants within the 13 economies. As expected, the correlation statistics show a strong
relation between IUi;t and i;t. Unsurprisingly, there is an even stronger correlation be-
tween IUi;t and SDi;t(), whereas yi;t and the corresponding volatility are only weakly
correlated with IUi;t. In contrast, the deviations from the Taylor rule, in particular ~R
 
i;t,
are strongly related to IUi;t. The correlation between both V ri;t(R) and d
tolerant
i;t with
IUi;t is rather low. Moreover, the mutual correlations among the measures that are based
on the deviations from the Taylor rule, V ri;t(R) and d
tolerant
i;t are comparably low. This
suggests that the distinct ways we employ to evaluate monetary policy might deliver
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independent information on the emergence of IUi;t.
[Place Table 3 here]
5.2 IU and the macroeconomy
In the following, the parameter estimates of the SUR model given by (8) and (9) are
discussed. Specication I in Table 4 relates IUi;t solely to the macroeconomic quanti-
ties i;t 1, yi;t 1 and their respective volatilities SDi;t 1() and SDi;t 1(y).12 This rst
specication is intended to replicate the ndings of previous studies that focus on the
macroeconomic determinants of IUi;t. In line with Grier and Perry (1998, 2000), Con-
rad and Karanasos (2005a,b) or Hartmann and Herwartz (2012), we nd a positive and
signicant eect of i;t 1 on IUi;t.13 Furthermore, we nd that IUi;t is signicantly and
positively related to SDi;t 1(). That is, uncertainty increases with the variability in in-
ation. The coecient estimate reported in Table 4 shows that an increase in SDi;t 1()
by one percentage point is accompanied by a higher IUi;t of about 0.26 percentage points.
In stark contrast, neither yi;t 1 nor its variability, SDi;t 1(y), appear to be signicantly
related to IUi;t. This nding is line with Mankiw et al. (2003, p.229) who report that
ination uncertainty (disagreement) shows \no clear relationship with measures of real
activity".
Figure 2 shows the trajectory of the estimated time-xed eect ^t in (9), i.e. the cross-
sectional time trend in IUi;t. As for the case of the country-specic plots of IUi;t, ^t reects
the reduction of ination uncertainty during the Great Moderation period. Moreover, ^t
indicates that the cross-sectional average ination uncertainty is increasing towards the
end of the sample period.
[Place Figure 2 here]
12To increase readability, the coecient estimates in all Tables are multiplied by a factor of 100.
13In contrast to our approach, previous studies have mainly focused on individual economies and
monthly measures of IU.
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[Place Table 4 here]
5.3 The relation between monetary policy and IU
Next, specication I in Table 4 is extended by including variables that reect the stance
of monetary policy. We particularly emphasize the relation between IUi;t and the char-
acterization of monetary policy schemes as more or less ination-averse on the one hand
and ad-hoc versus rule-based on the other hand. The rst set of estimates are reported
in columns II to V.
First, we evaluate monetary policy by means of ~Ri;t 1, the deviations of the realized
policy rate from the value implied by the Taylor rule. As shown in columns II to IV, the
eect of the deviations' magnitude j ~Ri;t 1j is positive and signicant at the 5%-level, i.e.
deviations from the Taylor rule are associated with increasing IUi;t. In specication V,
j ~Ri;t 1j is split into ~R+i;t 1 and ~R i;t 1, which quantify the eects of overly expansionary and
contractionary monetary policy schemes separately. Importantly, the coecient on ~R i;t 1
is negative and signicant at the 5%-level which means that IUi;t tends to be higher when
monetary policy is expansive beyond the degree which is recommended by the Taylor rule.
In sharp contrast, the parameter estimate related to ~R+i;t 1 is insignicant, i.e. contrac-
tionary policies do not aect IU. Interestingly, the coecient on i;t 1 turns insignicant
if measures based on ~Ri;t 1 are included in columns II to V. Thus, the signicance of
i;t 1 in specication I could be rationalized by regarding ination as a crude proxy of
an inadequately loose monetary policy. The relatively high correlation between i;t 1 and
~R i;t 1 as shown in Table 3 underlines this suggestion.
Second, IUi;t might be inuenced by the variation in short-term interest rates, V ri;t 1(R).
Dovern et al. (2012) examine the impact of a metric similar to V ri;t 1(R) on the dis-
agreement of ination expectations and nd that disagreement increases during periods
of highly volatile interest rates. However, in our case, the linkage between IUi;t and
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V ri;t 1(R) is insignicant across all model reformulations reported in Table 4. This nd-
ing does not change if covariates based on ~Ri;t 1 are excluded. It is also evident from the
correlation statistics in Table 3 that V ri;t 1(R) is only weakly related to j ~Ri;t 1j, ~R+i;t 1 or
~R i;t 1. Thus, the explanatory content of V ri;t 1(R) seems to be low.
Third, column III of Table 4 presents parameter estimates for the case that the dummy
variables dtoleranti;t 1 and d
>Ti
i;t 1 are included. The estimated coecients of both d
tolerant
i;t 1 and
d>Tii;t 1 are positive but only d
tolerant
i;t 1 is signicant. That is, IUi;t appears to be higher during
episodes when less ination-averse governors are in power.14 A comparison of columns II
and III shows that the coecient estimates on i;t 1, yi;t 1, SDi;t 1(), SDi;t 1(y) and
j ~Ri;t 1j remain almost unchanged.
However, as discussed in Ball (1992), monetary policy schemes which put less emphasis
on low ination might increase IUi;t in particular during periods of high ination. We
examine this hypothesis in specications IV and V which include the interaction term
dtolerant;Tii;t 1 . We allow for an economy-specic threshold level since it is possible that the
inuence of monetary policy comes into eect at dierent levels of i;t 1 for distinct
economies. The coecient estimate for dtolerant;Tii;t 1 shows that IUi;t is signicantly higher if
i;t 1 > Ti and dtoleranti;t 1 = 1. This clearly conrms that prediction of Ball's (1992) model,
i.e. this inuence on IUi;t comes into eect mainly if higher ination rates prevail during
the mandate of more ination-tolerant governors.
Next, we reestimate all models by replacing ination as well as the country-specic thresh-
old with the ination gap variable. The corresponding estimates are summarized in
columns VI to X of Table 4. Specication VI yields results which are similar to the ones
from model I. In contrast to column II and III, however, ~GAPi;t 1 remains signicant if j ~Ri;t 1j
and dtoleranti;t 1 are incorporated (columns VII and VIII). Most importantly, in columns IX
14This nding is also in line with the theoretical results derived in Conrad and Eife (2012). Using a
simple New Keynesian model, they show that ination persistence as well as the variability of ination
increase (decrease) if a central bank places less (more) weight on ination relative to output growth.
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and X, the indicator dtoleranti;t 1 remains signicant even after including d
tolerant
i;t 1 ~GAPi;t 1 , which
is not the case in specications IV and V. Our estimation results imply that a deviation of
ination from its trend leads to a stronger increase in IUi;t when the central bank gover-
nor is perceived as less inclined to adopt a disinationary monetary policy (dtoleranti;t 1 = 1).
Figure 3 illustrates this result graphically. It shows a comparison of the predicted ination
uncertainties, ^IU i;t, given d
tolerant
i;t 1 = 0 (solid red line) or d
tolerant
i;t 1 = 1 (dashed blue line)
as a function of the level of the lagged ination gap. The predictions ^IU i;t are obtained
by setting all covariates in (8) except ~GAPi;t 1 and the country- and time-xed eects in
(9) to their average values. The gure reveals that the predictions ^IU i;t are at in the
case of conservative governors, i.e. under ination-averse governors IU does not respond
to changes in the ination gap. In sharp contrast, for ination-tolerant governors there is
a positive relation between the ination gap and IU. Figure 3 also shows the histogram
of the ination gap. Obviously, the eect on IU of being a more or less ination-averse
governor becomes more pronounced with larger ination gaps.
[Place Figure 3 here]
5.4 Alternative volatility measures
In this Section, we consider two alternative measures for the unobservable ination un-
certainty as dependent variables in the SUR estimation. A rst natural candidate is the
ex-post ination variability SDi;t(). As Engle et al. (2013) and Conrad and Loch (2014)
point out, the ex-post measure SDi;t() can be considered a noisy proxy for the ex-ante
measure IUi;t. The columns labeled SDi;t() in Table 5 present parameter estimates when
IUi;t is replaced by SDi;t() as the dependent variable. Clearly, SDi;t() is strongly re-
lated to its own past lag and also to the variability in industrial production. While ~R i;t 1
does have a strong impact on SDi;t(), the link between SDi;t() and d
tolerant
i;t 1 appears to
exist only when the regression is based on the ination gap. These ndings suggest that
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it can be important to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post measures when analyzing
the determinants of long-term ination uncertainty.
[Place Table 5 here]
The second measure we consider comes from a standard GARCH model which assumes
that the unconditional (country specic) variance of ination is constant over time. As-
suming that i;t = i, equation (6) reduces to
fIU i;t =  1=2i
 X
m2t
gi;t;m
!1=2
: (13)
Although the unconditional variance is constant, fIU i;t still varies from year-to-year sinceP
m2t gi;t;m can be low in certain years but high in others depending on the size of the
ination forecast errors. As Table 5 shows, using fIU i;t as the dependent variable, we
again nd that IU is driven by periods of overly expansive monetary policy and ination-
tolerant governors that are in power in times of high ination. Although the changes in
fIU i;t are now entirely driven by variation in the short-term component, our result can be
explained by the fact that fIU i;t still extracts some long-term information by aggregating
the gi;t;m over the year.
5.5 Robustness analysis
In this Section, we demonstrate the robustness of our empirical ndings with respect to
reformulations of the model described in (8) and (9).
First, we consider two additional explanatory variables for IUi;t. As argued by, e.g.,
Conrad and Loch (2014), IUi;t may be related to uctuations in nancial markets. We
proxy global stock market volatility by computing the (yearly) realized volatility measure
RVt 1 =
sX
d2t 1
r2d;t 1;
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where rd;t 1 denotes the daily return on the MSCI World Equity Index. The results in the
second column of Table 6 show that the inuence of RVt 1 on IUi;t is signicantly positive
and also comparably large. Further, economic policymakers outside a central bank might
aect IUi;t, especially if the mandate of monetary policy is not legally guaranteed to
be independent of the government. Hence, we relate IUi;t to an indicator of central
bank independence, denoted as indepi;t 1, which equals unity during the years when the
central bank of economy i is ocially independent (see Dovern et al., 2012). The negative
coecient estimate in the third column of Table 6 shows that IUi;t is lower for higher
degrees of indepi;t 1. Thus, economies where monetary policy is less aected by political
inuences are characterized by lower IUi;t. Our nding is in line with with Alesina and
Summers (1993) who rst established that countries with less independent central banks
are characterized as having more volatile ination rates. A relation between central bank
independence and IUi;t or the disagreement of ination expectations is also documented
by Grier and Perry (1998) and Dovern et al. (2012), respectively.
Second, our ndings might be distorted by observations from the years after the un-
folding of the nancial- and sovereign debt crisis in 2008. It is possible that during this
period, IUi;t is higher due to increased uncertainty about the economic outlook in general.
In order to show that this does not aect our ndings, we reestimate our model for a sam-
ple that does not include the years after 2008. In Table 6, the corresponding parameter
estimates can be found in the column labeled \before 2008". Clearly, our ndings are
robust to excluding the most recent observations.
The third robustness check uses an alternative method to specify common eects in
the specication of the error term. Instead of estimating time-xed eects as in (9),
one may include cross-section averages xt 1 = (1=N)
PN
i=1 xi;t 1 to proxy for unobserved
eects common to all economies (Pesaran, 2006). The corresponding results are reported
in the column labeled \with xt 1; t = 0" and show that the conclusions drawn from
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column V of Table 4 remain valid if common disturbances are modeled in terms of xt 1.
Fourth, the empirical ndings might be aected through potential mis-classication
of the EMU monetary policy regime, because 6 out of 13 economies in our cross section
have delegated their responsibility for monetary policy to the ECB after the formation of
the EMU. So far, we have coded dtolerantt = 0 for the EMU economies after the inception
of the Euro. We choose this specication of dtolerantt since it can be argued that the
way the ECB has been set up is in the spirit of the (presumably rather ination-averse)
German Bundesbank (Hayo and Hofmann, 2006). However, it is also possible that the
(recent) monetary policy of the ECB is more inuenced by EMU economies with a higher
preference for discretionary monetary policy. For example, Sturm and Wollmershauser
(2008) nd that small member countries have relatively strong voting power in monetary
policy decisions. Moreover, Faust et al. (2001) nd that an estimated reaction function
of the ECB reveals a higher emphasis on output stabilization than the corresponding
Bundesbank estimate. Thus, in an alternative specication we set dtoleranti;t 1 = 1 instead of
dtoleranti;t 1 = 0 for the Eurozone economies. The corresponding estimates are reported in the
rightmost column of Table 6, which shows that our main ndings are not aected. The
interaction term now even takes a slightly higher value than before which might suggest
that the ECB's policy is indeed best characterized as less ination-averse.
[Place Table 6 here]
5.6 Comparison of IUi;t with survey based ination uncertainty
As discussed in Section 1, ideally we would like to measure ination uncertainty directly
using survey data. However, survey expectations on ination are only available for se-
lected countries and restricted time periods. Nevertheless, in this Section we compare our
model-based uncertainty measure for the US, IUUS;t, with data from the FED's Survey
of Professional Forecasters. Following Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2010) or Dovern
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et al. (2012) we use the disagreement among forecasters to measure IU. Specically, we
measure disagreement, DisUS;t, by the interquartile range of the individual forecasters'
one-year-ahead point predictions of the annualized quarterly growth rate of the CPI. We
choose this forecast horizon since it matches our focus on yearly IU and, in addition,
it is well known that the suitability of disagreement as a proxy of uncertainty deterio-
rates with the forecast horizon (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010). Figure 4 depicts the evolution
of DisUS;t and IUi;t which appear to be quite similar. In both cases, we observe the
downward trend associated with the Great Moderation since the early 1980s and raising
levels of uncertainty towards the end of the sample period. Nevertheless, the graph also
makes it clear that IUi;t is leading with respect to DisUS;t which is further conrmed by
a simple cross-correlation analysis. This leading property may be due to the fact that the
Spline-GARCH model is not estimated in real-time and, therefore, essentially employs
forward-looking information to determine current long-term uncertainty.
[Place Figure 4 here]
6 Conclusions
We analyze the determinants of long-term IU for 13 industrialized economies. Long-term
IU is measured as the aggregated yearly conditional variance in the framework of the
Spline-GARCH model as introduced by Engle and Rangel (2008).
We nd that monetary policy and macroeconomic conditions do not act as independent
sources of IU but that the most sizeable increases in ination uncertainty occur if less
ination-averse central bank governors are in charge of monetary policy during periods of
high ination. Following Ball (1992), our interpretation of this nding is that governors'
attitudes towards ination are an important driver of long-term IU.
A further signicant eect materializes if interest rates set by central banks deviate
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from those prescribed by the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). This underlines the role of ad-
hoc monetary policy schemes as a source of IU. In particular, IU increases after actual
interest rates have been lower than the level suggested by the Taylor rule, i.e. after periods
of unduely expansive monetary policy. Since global monetary policy can be currently
described as very accommodative, our results suggest that one of the risks of \exiting too
late or too slowly" could be increasing IU (BIS, 2014, p.99).
An examination of alternative approximations of IU shows that the Spline-GARCH-
implied metric is more suitable than other approaches such as the intra-annual stan-
dard deviation of ination or the annualized conditional variance from a conventional
GARCH(1,1) model.
The documented eects are robust with respect to restricting the sample period and a
variety of model reformulations. Excluding the observations from the year 2008 onwards
shows that our conclusions are not driven by the exceptionally high aggregate uncertainty
during that period. Similarly, the classication of the monetary policy scheme of the
ECB as more or less ination-tolerant, which is more dicult than for single economies,
is not a crucial driver of the reported outcomes. Moreover, we nd that the volatility
in international stock markets has a signicant inuence on IU. Furthermore, alternative
ways of modeling dependencies in the disturbance process among the cross-section units
leads to essentially identical ndings.
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Country-specic summary statistics
i SDi() yi SDi(y)
Canada 4.04 0.84 2.34 2.62
Denmark 4.22 0.99 1.98 19.82
Finland 4.41 0.82 3.00 12.10
France 4.19 0.57 0.93 9.46
Germany 2.39 0.67 1.58 5.41
Italy 6.46 0.56 1.12 9.83
Norway 4.56 0.95 2.65 14.27
Portugal 9.36 1.72 2.25 9.46
Spain 6.91 1.03 1.11 7.10
Sweden 4.61 1.15 1.86 7.47
Switzerland 2.10 0.75 0.79 0.68
UK 5.66 0.94 0.57 10.24
US 4.02 0.68 2.19 2.15
Note: Cell entries report averages i = (1=T )
P
t i;t and SDi() = (1=T )
P
t SDi;t() in columns 2 and
3, respectively. The statistics yi and SDi(y) are computed analogously.
Table 2: Specication diagnostics for the Spline-GARCH model in (4)
P
()
i P
(y)
i ^i ^i Ki
Canada 5 2 0.19 0.56 1
Denmark 9 0 0.11 0.09 1
Finland 7 0 0.11 0.89 1
France 8 0 0.14 0.62 1
Germany 10 4 0.26 0.51 1
Italy 6 0 0.28 0.23 1
Norway 8 0 0.18 0.28 2
Portugal 8 0 0.29 0.11 1
Spain 10 0 0.21 0.45 1
Sweden 8 0 0.38 0.12 1
Switzerland 6 1 0.06 0.84 1
UK 6 3 0.32 0.48 1
US 4 0 0.20 0.65 1
Note: The reported numbers are rounded to two decimals. Estimates for Finland satisfy ^i + ^i < 1.
Table 3: Correlations between IUi;t and its potential determinants
IUi;t i;t ~
GAP
i;t yi;t SDi;t() SDi;t(y) j ~Ri;tj ~R+i;t ~R i;t V ri;t(R)
i;t 0.60 
~GAPi;t 0.33 0.34 
yi;t -0.01 0.05 -0.20 
SDi;t() 0.77 0.48 0.32 -0.07 
SDi;t(y) 0.13 0.15 0.08 -0.09 0.17 
j ~Ri;tj 0.56 0.69 0.26 0.02 0.44 0.12 
~R+i;t -0.19 -0.34 -0.21 -0.08 -0.15 0.02 0.11 
~R i;t -0.61 -0.82 -0.34 -0.07 -0.47 -0.09 -0.85 0.39 
V ri;t(R) 0.18 0.13 0.05 -0.07 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.19 -0.07 
dtoleranti;t -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.03
Note: For each country we rst calculate the correlation between the dierent variables, e.g., IUi;t and
i;t. The numbers reported are the averages of these correlations across the 13 countries.
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Table 5: Results for alternative dependent variables
Dependent variable: SDi;t() fIU i;t
 = i;t 1  = ~GAPi;t 1  = i;t 1  = ~GAPi;t 1
  0:51
( 0:52)
 0:00
( 0:00)
0:75
(1:24)
0:22
(0:46)
yi;t 1 0:07
(0:24)
0:33
(1:15)
0:03
(0:17)
0:03
(0:16)
SDi;t 1() 32:95
(7:74)
30:38
(7:09)
34:46
(16:01)
32:04
(12:60)
SDi;t 1(y) 0:78
(2:91)
0:77
(2:74)
0:28
(1:60)
0:14
(0:69)
~R+i;t 1  0:08
( 0:08)
0:56
(0:58)
0:67
(1:19)
0:48
(0:72)
~R i;t 1  3:25
( 4:21)
 3:22
( 6:12)
 2:64
( 5:63)
 2:72
( 6:52)
V ri;t 1(R) 0:60
(0:55)
0:20
(0:18)
0:94
(1:60)
0:79
(1:07)
dtoleranti;t 1 1:76
(0:59)
5:51
(2:10)
2:00
(1:19)
7:28
(3:60)
d>Tii;t 1 1:04
(0:18)
 4:28
( 1:29)
dtolerant;Tii;t 1 4:65
(0:80)
16:44
(4:60)
dtoleranti;t 1  ~GAPi;t 1 3:90
(3:44)
1:66
(2:00)
Notes: see Table 4.
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Ination uncertainty IUi;t from model (2) and (4)
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Figure 1: IUi;t from model (7) and (8) for 13 economies.
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Figure 2: The estimated cross-sectional time trend in IUi;t as represented by ^t in (9).
Estimates ^t are obtained from the model specication reported in the column I of Table
4.
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Figure 3: Predictions ^IU i;t for d
tolerant
i;t 1 = 0 (solid red line) and d
tolerant
i;t 1 = 1 (dashed blue
line), based on estimates from column X of Table 4. Shaded areas depict 95%-condence
intervals. The intersection of both predictions is indicated by the vertical line. Below, a
histogram of ~GAPi;t 1 is depicted. The magnitude of ^IU i;t is measured on the left scale, the
right scale corresponds to the values of the histogram for ~GAPi;t 1 .
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Figure 4: US ination uncertainty as measured by IUUS;t (Spline-GARCH, solid line)
and DisUS;t (interquartile range of ination forecasts from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, dashed line).
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